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On several occasions during the period 2001-2003, the European Central Bank
(ECB) decided to deviate from its “neutral” benchmark allotment rule, with the
eﬀect of not alleviating a temporary liquidity shortage in the banking system.
This is remarkable because it implied the possibility of short-term interest rates
raising signiﬁcantly above the main policy rate. In the present paper, we show
that when the monetary authority cares for both liquidity and interest rate
conditions, the optimal allotment policy may entail a discontinuous reaction to
initial conditions. More precisely, we prove that there is a threshold level for
the accumulated aggregate liquidity position in the banking system prior to the
last operation in a given maintenance period, so that the benchmark allotment
is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are above the threshold, and a tight
allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are below the threshold.
JEL CODES: E43, E52
KEYWORDS: euro, monetary policy instruments, operational framework, re-
ﬁnancing operations
ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 4Non-technical summary
On several occasions during the past three years, short-term interest rates in the
euro area departed more visuably than usual from the mid of the interest rate
corridor. These deviations all followed occurrences of so-called underbidding,
meaning that a number of major commercial banks, for speculative reasons,
reduced their bids in one of the Eurosystem’s main reﬁnancing operation. In
all cases, the European Central Bank decided to not fully compensate for the
liquidity shortage created by the underbidding, providing the banking system
with only partial relief from the tight conditions in the money market. Is this
observation consistent with optimal central bank behavior?
To address this question, we propose a model that captures some of the main
institutional aspects of the Eurosystem’s operational framework. The liquidity
(i.e., short-term credit) required by the banking system is provided by the cen-
tral bank through weekly main reﬁnancing operations. Banks demand liquidity,
inter alia, to meet reserve requirements on average over a four-week maintenance
period. After the last operation in any given period, a liquidity shock may aﬀect
the aggregate liquidity position in the banking system, and counterparties may
adjust their reserve balances by having recourse to the central bank’s standing
deposit and lending facilities. Within this model, we consider the central bank’s
problem of choosing allotments in a sequence of main reﬁnancing operations.
One central result of the analysis says that when the monetary authority cares
for both interest rates and for outstanding liquidity, then the optimal intertem-
poral allotment strategy in the relevant parameter range implies a discontinuous
reaction to initial conditions. Speciﬁcally, we prove that there is a threshold
level, so that the “neutral” benchmark allotment rule is optimal only when
the aggregate liquidity position is above the threshold, whereas a signiﬁcantly
tighter allotment is optimal when the liquidity position is below the threshold.
The result relies on the averaging provision for central bank reserves over the
maintenance period. When the volume of the penultimate tender in a mainte-
nance period has been insuﬃcient then, because the last tender is close to the
e n do ft h ep e r i o d ,t h e“ n e u t r a l ”b e n c h m a r ka l l o t m e n ti nt h el a s tt e n d e rw o u l d
be very large. Injecting the benchmark allotment would therefore imply that
also the aggregate central bank credit outstanding to the banking system is
very large. On the other hand, being tight would induce interest rates to rise to
the upper end of the corridor. It turns out that the described trade-oﬀ between
liquidity and interest-rate smoothing is typically non-convex, which causes the
described eﬀect.
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From January 1st, 1999, the euro has replaced the individual currencies of alto-
gether 11 European countries. Greece followed by joining the euro area in the
beginning of 2001, and there are currently 13 further sovereign countries that
are considered as candidates to join the world’s second largest currency union
in the near future. The creation of the new currency and the persuance of a
monetary policy implied the design of a new policy framework for monetary pol-
icy implementation and liquidity management.4 T h ea i mo ft h ep r e s e n tp a p e r
is to contribute to the understanding of this operational framework, especially
concerning the economics that link the decisions of the monetary authority and
the behavior of short-term interest rates in the interbank market. To this aim,
we propose a model that captures some of the main institutional aspects of the
Eurosystem’s operational framework, where we focus on the active role of the
central bank as a provider of liquidity to the banking system.5
Our model has the following structure. Banks have to satisfy reserve require-
ments as an average of the reserve account balance over a four-week mainte-
nance period.6 The required liquidity is provided by the monetary authority
through weekly main reﬁnancing operations. Credits that are allocated in these
operations have a maturity of two weeks.7 After the last operation in any given
period, a liquidity shock may aﬀect the aggregate liquidity position in the bank-
ing system, and counterparties may have recourse either to the marginal lending
facility or to the deposit facility.
Within this framework, we consider the central bank’s problem of choosing al-
lotments in a sequence of main reﬁnancing operations. Interest rates are steered
indirectly via an end-of-period liquidity eﬀect. It is assumed that the central
bank’s objective function is a discounted weighted sum of squared interest rate
and liquidity deviations over all future maintenance periods. Under these as-
sumptions, the monetary authority faces in general a trade-oﬀ between being
4The European framework is diﬀerent from the framework established by the U.S. Federal
Reserve system, but also has some commonalities (see Borio [5] for a comparison). The
Eurosystem’s operational framework is documented in ECB [7]. For a description of the
framework as an element of the ECB’s overall monetary strategy, see Manna, Pill, and Quiros
[17].
5The Eurosystem is composed of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national
central banks of the 12 countries that have adopted the new currency.
6This assumption is made for convenience. In reality, the maintenance period is usually
one month.
7As from March 2004, the operational framework will be somewhat modiﬁed. In particular,
under the new regime, operations will not overlap, and will not hang over into the subsequent
maintenance period. The conclusions are not aﬀected. See Section 6.
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will study the resulting dynamic programming problem in the ﬁrst part of the
paper, and compare the optimal policy with the so-called benchmark allotment
rule that is normally applied by the ECB in its main reﬁnancing operations.
The second part of the paper is concerned with the optimal allotment in the
respective last operation in the reserve maintenance period. This allotment
decision is most decisive for monetary policy implementation because it deter-
mines to a large extent the liquidity conditions at the end of the period. Figure
1 exhibits the EONIA money market index in the year 2001. It can be seen
that the overnight interest rate spiked upwards at the end of the maintenance
periods in February, April, and October. These conditions have been caused
by occurrences of a phenomenon usually referred to as “underbidding,” mean-
ing that the largest banks in the market, for speculative reasons, reduced their
bids in a central bank operation (cf. Ewerhart [11] or Nyborg, Bindseil and
Strebulaev [18]). Similar patterns can be seen in the data for the subsequent
years 2002 and 2003. Our question is why the ECB did not fully compensate
the shortfall in liquidity created by the underbidding. We therefore study in
somewhat more depth the optimal allotment in the last tender.8
To our knowledge, the issue of an optimal intertemporal allotment policy has
not been addressed so far in the literature. Most of the established theoret-
ical literature on the interbank market for reserves, as originated by work of
Poole [19], Ho and Saunders [15], Campbell [6], Spindt and Hoﬀmeister [20],
and Hamilton [13], has tended to abstract from the active role of the central
bank, with only a few recent exceptions. Bartolini, Bertola and Prati [3] de-
velop an intertemporal model of the market for Federal Funds allowing for daily
central bank intervention. Without intervention, the expected variance of the
market rate is increasing over the maintenance period. With unconstrained
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,h o w e v e r ,t h ec e n t r a lb a n km a yi m p l e m e n ti t st a r g e ti n t e r e s tr a t e
in all but the ﬁnal day of the maintenance period. The model thereby allows
a positive analysis of the consequences of various central bank policies on the
time-series properties of the Federal Funds rate. Bartolini, Bertola and Prati [2]
oﬀer an explanation for the empirical observation that banks in the U.S. tend to
hold more reserves on settlement days than on other days of the maintenance
8The obvious explanation is that the increased rates at the end of the period should make
underbidding unproﬁtable. However, this argument can be valid only for the initial episodes
of underbidding. Central bankers realized very soon that, unexpectedly, the two-week swap
rate continued to fall below the minimum bid rate on the day of a critical operation, despite
the substantial threat (see [9]).
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two-day reserve maintenance period. It is shown that under uncertainty about
reserve requirements, and in the presence of transaction costs, when the Federal
Reserve leaves the market rate constant over the maintenance period, demand
for reserves is higher on the second day than on the ﬁrst. While the paper does
not write out an objective function for the central bank, it discusses informally
the trade-oﬀ between a higher interest rate vis-` a-vis increased reserves on set-
tlement day from the point of view of the central bank. Ayuso and Repullo
[1] study the demand in ﬁxed and variable rate tenders, and consider in this
context also the static allotment problem of a central bank. It is assumed that
the central bank’s loss function penalizes market rates below the target more
severely than market rates above the target. This induces the central bank to
choose a tight allotment volume. As a consequence, allotments in ﬁxed-rate
tenders (where banks pay the target rate) are proﬁtable, generating overbid-
ding. However, in a variable-rate tender with pre-announced liquidity injection,
there is a bidding equilibrium without excess demand.9
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
In section 3, we derive the optimal intertemporal allotment policy. In sections 4
and 5, we discuss the optimal allotment in the last operation of a given period.
Section 6 discusses the validity of our results under the recently released changes
to the operational framework. Section 7 concludes. The appendix contains
details on calibration and simulation as well as technical derivations.
2 A model of the operational framework
We consider a time horizon consisting of an inﬁnite number of consecutive
maintenance periods t =0 ,1,2,...,e a c ho fw h i c hc o r r e s p o n d st oa ni n t e r v a l
[t;t+1]. 10 In each maintenance period t, there are four main reﬁnancing oper-
a t i o n so rt e n d e r sA ,B ,C ,a n dDa tt i m e s
t + τA <t+ τB <t+ τC <t+ τD,
where τA > 0a n dτD < 1. Maturities are assumed to be overlapping, i.e, credit
allocated in a given tender matures at the date of the tender after next. E.g.,
9More recently, Bindseil [4] has argued that the ECB has tended to create loose liquidity
conditions at the end of maintenance periods during the overbidding episode, which would
contrast with the objective function assumed by Ayuso and Repullo.
10To denote points in continuous time, we will use the greek letter τ,w h i l et h el a t i nt refers
to discrete points in time or to maintenance periods.
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maturing at time τA of period t, the last tender D in period t−1 allocates credit
maturing at time τB,a n ds oo n .
The aggregate amount of central bank credit allocated to the banking sector
in period t’s tender A is denoted by Yt,A, and so on for the other tenders.
The resulting liquidity supply to the banking system is characterized by the
property that at any point in time, transactions allocated at two subsequent
weeks contribute to the fulﬁlment of the reserve requirements. Formally, the
instantaneous liquidity conditions, i.e., the outstanding volume of central bank





Yt−1,D + Yt,A for t + τA < τ ≤ t + τB
Yt,A + Yt,B for t + τB < τ ≤ t + τC
Yt,B + Yt,C for t + τC < τ ≤ t + τD
Yt,C + Yt,D for t + τD < τ ≤ t +1+τA
.( 1 )
The market rate does not depend on the instantaneous, but on the (expected)






It is not diﬃcult to check that under the assumptions on timing made above,
we have
Zt = τAYt−1,C + τBYt−1,D +(τC − τA)Yt,A +( 2 )
+(τD − τB)Yt,B +( 1− τC)Yt,C +(1− τD)Yt,D.
Thus, altogether six operations contribute to the fulﬁlment of reserve require-
ments in any given maintenance period t,t w oo fw h i c hh a n go v e rf r o mt h e
previous periodt − 1.
Aggregate liquidity demand during period t is equal to the sum of exogenous
aggregate reserve requirements R, assumed for simplicity to be unchanged over
time, and stochastic autonomous liquidity factors At. Changes to autononous
factors such as banknotes in circulation and government balances in the ac-
counts of some national central banks cause liquidity ﬂows between the banking
system and the non-bank sector which are (by deﬁnition) outside of the control
of the central bank’s liquidity management.11 The random variables At are
assumed to be independently and identically distributed with a diﬀerentiable
cumulative distribution function G(A) .S h o c k sa r em e a s u r e di ne u r od a y s ,t h a t
11For a more exhaustive description of automonous factors in the euro area, see [8].
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ity shock At is assumed to realize after the last reﬁnancing operation in that
period, at time t + τs,w h e r eτD < τs < 1.12
Considered as a total over the period, we assume that demand for liquidity is
perfectly inelastic with respect to interest rate conditions. Counterparties in
the euro area usually prefer to have recourse to the marginal lending facility
over being sanctioned for not complying with the minimum reserve obligation.
Moreover, and in contrast to the Federal reserve system, excess reserves do not
play a signiﬁcant role in the euro area in relative terms.13 Note also that the
demand for reserves is typically elastic within the period. Autonomous factors
are in general inelastic in the short run, but may be cross-ﬁnanced by reserve
holdings.
Standing facilities oﬀer individual banks the opportunity to borrow and lend
an arbitrary amount overnight at the marginal lending rate rL and the deposit
rate rD <r L, respectively.14 Because of the averaging provision of reserve
requirements over the maintenance period, standing facilities are rationally used
only at the end of the maintenance period, i.e., after the realization of the
autonomous factor shock.
The market rate prevailing in period t after the realization of the autonomous
factor shock is denoted by rs
t. From the inelasticity of demand at the end of
the period and from the availability of the standing facilities, it follows that
the market rate at the end of the last day of the maintenance period is a step




rL if Zt − At < R
rD if Zt − At > R
.
Thus, in the model the market rate reaches the marginal lending rate when the
aggregate average liquidity supply is below aggregate demand, and analogously
the market rate drops to the deposit rate when supply exceeds demand. There-
fore, as has been noted before, under the martingale hypothesis, the level of the
12This assumption is made for simplicity. In reality, autonomous factors resemble a
continuous-time stochastic process.
13Absolute ﬁgures for average excess reserves are in fact not that diﬀerent (USD 1 bn in the
U.S. vs EUR 0.65 bn in the euro area).
14The ECB requires all central bank credits to be collateralized, including any recourse to
the marginal lending facility. Since this requirement has never become binding on an aggregate
level, we will ignore it in the model.
15We do not specify the behavior of the market rate in the zero-probability case of a perfect
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rates of the standing facilities, where the weights are given by the respective
probabilities that the upper and lower boundaries of the interest rate corridor
are reached at the end of the last day of the period.16
Proposition 1. Let Zt denote the average liquidity supply expected for period
t. Then the market rate at any time t ≤ τ <t+ τs in period t is given by
rτ =( 1− G(Zt − R))rL + G(Zt − R)rD,( 3 )
where 1 − G(Zt − R) is the probability of ending the maintenance period with
recourse to the marginal lending facility, and G(Zt − R) is the probability of
ending the maintenance period with recourse to the deposit facility.
Proof. See text above. ¤
The relevance of Proposition 1 comes from the fact that it provides a link
between the central bank’s allotment policy and the market rate prevailing on
the interbank market. E.g., if the market expects the allotment policy to be
restrictive, or else that autonomous factors will drain the banking system after
the last operation in a given period, then the market rate will increase above
the mid of the corridor. In fact, the existing experience with the framework
(e.g., during the episodes of non-accomodating central bank behavior) suggests
that this argument captures a ﬁrst-order determinant for the EONIA money
market index in the euro area.
3 Optimal allotment policy
Proposition 1 suggests that the monetary authority, in order to implement its
interest rate target r∗ ∈ (rD;rL), would have to provide for average liquidity
conditions Z∗ such that
r∗ =( 1− G(Z∗ − R))rL + G(Z∗ − R)rD.( 4 )
Solving for Z∗ gives the neutral average liquidity as a sum of aggregate reserve
requirements and a percentile of the autonomous factor distribution
Z∗ = R + G−1(
rL − r∗
rL − rD).
16It is essentially undisputed in the empirical literature that the EONIA follows approxi-
mately a martingale process. See Ewerhart et al. [12] for details.
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i.e., when r∗ =( rL + rD)/2, the liquidity target is just the sum of reserve
requirements and the median of the autonomous factor shock distribution.
It will be assumed in this paper that the central bank wishes to implement its
interest rate target in a smooth manner. By this formulation, we mean that the
monetary authority will have a preference for keeping ﬂuctuations both of the
market rate and in the supply of liquidity to the banking sector at a minimum.
The obvious target value for the instantaneous liquidity is L∗ := Z∗. Formally,





(rτ − r∗)2 + µ(Lτ − L∗)2¢
dτ], (5)
where δ is the discount factor, and µ>0 is the relative weight given to the ob-
jective of liquidity smoothing vis-` a-vis the objective of interest rate smoothing.
With this objective function, we suppose that the central bank should care also
about the instantaneous volume of outstanding credit. This assumption can
be disputed by the claim that the liquidity target does not matter for imple-
mentation of monetary policy, as long as the average liquidity position at the
end of the period, and thereby the interest rate target is met. However, in our
opinion, it seems plausible that a central bank wishes to ensure a constant level
of satiation with liquidity. E.g., deviations from the target level to the down-
side might create situations where liquidity demand is no longer dominated
by the purpose of fulﬁlling reserve requirements, but aﬀected also by the less
predictable needs of daily banking business. This might then engender unde-
sirable eﬀects in the money market such as temporary market power, widened
bid-ask spreads, or increased price dispersion. These eﬀects may similarly come
about when the outstanding volume of liquidity is signiﬁcantly larger than the
pro-rata share, potentially leaving some individual banks overrunning with liq-
uidity. We conclude that ﬂuctuations in the outstanding central bank credit
may have undesirable consequences that either did not become visible in the
data due to the ECB’s neutral liquidity management, or for which the EONIA
is not a suﬃcient statistics. Introducing an implicit target for the outstanding
central bank credit is a way of taking account of these consequences.17
17An alternative motive for the central bank to keep ﬂuctuations of instantaneous liquidity
at a low level might be that overnight balances on diﬀerent days are not perfect substitutes
under all circumstances. E.g., it has been validated empirically that the EONIA exhibits a
weak, but measurable response to an on average increased liquidity demand at the end of
the calender month, which is due to window dressing activities (cf. [12]). A deviation from
neutral conditions might amplify these eﬀects. Finally, there is some empirical evidence, albeit
limited, for a non-zero liquidity eﬀect before the last operation.
ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 12Looking at the problem of determining a sequence of optimal liquidity injections
starting with the beginning of a maintenance period t0, the choice variables for












for all periods t ∈ {t0,t 0 +1 ,...}, where the normalization ∆Y := Y − L∗/2
helps to simplify the notation. The normalization of tender volumes is with
respect to L∗/2 because at any point in time, there is credit allocated in two
subsequent operations outstanding to the banking system. The state variables







that hang over from the previous maintenance period. The (trivial) law of







which is the formal counterpart of the notion that the volume of the tenders
in the previous period must be taken as given. Clearly, initial conditions are
given by the exogenous variables Yt0−1,C and Yt0−1,D.
An u m b e ro fs i m p l i ﬁcations are made in the subsequent analysis. Firstly, we
will assume that the monetary authority faces no problem whatsoever with in-
jecting its chosen allotments into the banking system. In reality, the assumption
is typically satisﬁed, due to signiﬁcant excess demand in the main reﬁnancing
operations, and to the neutral allotment policy chosen by the ECB.18 The op-
erations for which the Eurosystem has not been able to allocate the desired
amount of liquidity were just those subjected to strategic underbidding. Given
that we consider the theoretically optimal allotment policy, which is not neces-
sarily equivalent to the benchmark allotment rule in the deﬁnition of the ECB
(more on this at the end of this section), it is not apparent how restrictive the
assumption is. Nevertheless, we believe that useful insights can be gained even
under this simplifying assumption.
Another simpliﬁcation is that we will consider the limit case of τs being close
to 1. This means to ignore deviations from the target values that occur after
18In main reﬁnancing operations, banks are allowed to submit up to ten bids, each of which
consists of an interest rate and a volume. All bids specifying an interest rate above the
marginal rate are satisﬁed, and bids on the marginal rate are prorated. By excess demand,
we mean then the sum of unsatisﬁed bids with interest rates at or below the marginal rate.
ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 13the realization of the autonomous factor shock. The general conclusions are
not aﬀected. E.g., in the most relevant case when the target rate lies in the
center of the corridor, then having τs strictly below 1 is equivalent to a linear
transformation of the interest rate criterion, i.e., in a change in µ.
Finally, we will use a linear approximation for the liquidity eﬀect. The ﬁrst-
order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of equation (3) with respect to
Zt around Z∗ reads
rτ ≈ r∗ − ρ(Zt − Z∗),
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e d( 4 ) ,a n dw h e r e
ρ := G0(Z∗ − R)(rL − rD)
is a measure of the liquidity eﬀect.19 W i t ht h eh e l po ft h e s es i m p l i ﬁcations, the
objective function of the central bank, viewed as a function of the individual
allotments, becomes an inﬁnite sum of quadratic functions, as the following
auxiliary result shows.















for matrices K, Q and H that are functions of the exogenous parameters of the
model.
19The ﬁrst-order approximation replaces the typically sigmoid liquidity eﬀect (cf. Appen-
dix A) by a piecewise linear function with kinks at the marginal lending and deposit rates.
This raises two questions. The ﬁrst concerns the validity of the subsequently used dynamic
programming techniques in view of the boundary conditions (the kinks due to the standing
facilities) in our model. However, as the simulations show, the respective deviations from
interest rate and liquidity targets are declining over the maintenance periods. Thus, when
the boundary conditions are not binding in the initial maintenance period, they also do not
bind in subsequent periods. This argument suggests that the shape of the feasibility set is not
aﬀected by the boundary conditions unless binding in the initial maintenance period. Another
q u e s t i o ni sw h a tw o u l dh a p p e nt oo u rr e s u l t sw h e nt h ek i n k sa r es m o o t h e do u t .T h ea n s w e r
here can be best illustrated using Figure 9. Start with the diagram on the left-hand side. With
a sigmoid liquidity eﬀect, the trade-oﬀ between liquidity and interest-rate deviation becomes
concave left of L
∗,a n dc o n v e xr i g h to fL
∗. The change of coordinates brings us to the diagram
on the right-hand side. The graphs suggest that the convex-shaped curve between points A
and B in this diagram would bend in and become less convex, or would even become concave
over some region. Thus, it appears that a smoothing-out of the kinks in our model would even
amplify the non-convexity of the feasibility set, so that we are on the safe side here as well.
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This reformulation of the problem allows to apply the tools of linear-quadratic
dynamic programming, and we obtain a formula for the optimal allotment pol-
icy.
Theorem 1. (Optimal dynamic policy) The optimal allotment policy is of
the form
yt = −(Q + δB0PB)−1Hxt,
where P is a constant matrix of dimension (2 × 2) and B is the matrix of
dimension (2 × 4) on the right-hand side of equation (6).20
Proof. See the appendix. ¤
The simulations of our calibrated model (see the appendix for details on this)
indicate that the central bank’s problem is characterized by the following eco-
nomics. There is a motive to inject an amount of liquidity in the four tenders
of each maintenance period so that the target rate will be approximated as
closely as possible. At the same time, this comes at the cost of missing the
instantaneous liquidity target. The optimal policy will therefore keep the re-
spective sum of the sizes of two consecutive tenders approximately equal to the
instantaneous tender liquidity in the market immediately before the respective
tender (only approximately because of the discount factor), yet will deviate
from this principle in tenders A and D. In tender A, the idea is to obtain a
better overall level of liquidity than the one that resulted as an overlap from
the last period. In tender D, the monetary authority seeks also to achieve
closer-to-the-stationary-level conditions for the next maintenance period. The
optimal policy is a result of balancing all these trade-oﬀs (cf. Figure 3). Similar
considerations are possible in the case of an initial excess liquidity (cf. Figure
4). Of course, there is no trade-oﬀ under normal conditions.
The ECB follows a speciﬁc “neutral” or benchmark allotment rule, which means
that there is a formula that allows to calculate, prior to any main reﬁnancing
operation, the proper allotment (cf. [8]). The term neutral refers to the fact
that the allotment brings the aggregate accumulated liquidity position in the
banking system to its pro-rata value within the maintenance period at the time
of the subsequent tender in the same period (or, if there is no subsequent tender
within the same period, at the end of the maintenance period).
20With some eﬀort, one can even show that the matrix P has four identical entries, but this
fact has no obvious economic implications, so that we omit the proof.
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deﬁnition of the ECB is not equivalent to the theoretically optimal allotment
policy. E.g., in the example exhibited in Figure 3, the benchmark allotment in
tender A would be somewhat larger than the theoretically optimal allotment.
This is so because the benchmark allotment in tender A would be chosen so
as to compensate fully the initially red position of the banking system by the
time of tender B. That is, in the absense of interim shocks, the benchmark
allotment would generate a balanced aggregate liquidity position at time t+τB.
In contrast, the theoretically optimal allotment in tender A (as shown in Figure
3) is smaller, putting part of the balancing of the liquidity shortage to the
subsequent tenders B, C, and D. The theoretically optimal allotment thereby
takes account of the fact that a smaller deviation from the liquidity target,
albeit for a somewhat longer duration, is preferable for a central bank optimizing
our suggested objective function (5). The benchmark allotment rule thereby
appears “more proactive” than the theoretically optimal policy.
4 Allotment in the last tender
T h ed e c i s i o no v e rt h ea l l o t m e n ti nt h el a s to p e r a t i o ni nag i v e nm a i n t e n a n c e
period is typically considered to be the most important allotment decision,
because it determines the liquidity conditions at the end of the period, and
thereby the level of the prevailing interest rates. In the absence of shocks, there
is no trade-oﬀ between the criteria of interest rate and liquidity smoothing, and
the central bank may simply allot the benchmark amount, and may thereby
reach both interest-rate and liquidity target. However, in general, this will not
always be the case.
The trade-oﬀ will be especially pronounced after an occurrence of underbid-
ding in the penultimate operation. The term underbidding refers to a situation
where the total of the incoming bids in a central bank operation is lower than
the benchmark allotment. As in the given operation, the central bank can only
allocate liquidity by satisfying incoming bids, the central bank’s allotment is
bound to be below the benchmark allotment. In this sense, underbidding pre-
cludes the implementation of the the benchmark allotment rule, and generates
at r a d e - o ﬀ between liquidity and interest rate smoothing.
The formal set-up is as follows (cf. Figure 5). The information available to both
the market and the central bank at the time of tender D are the allotments in
the tenders up to tender C in period 0. The aggregate liquidity counting for
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bank in the operations prior to tender C, can be summarized in the term
Λ0,B := τA∆Y−1,C + τB∆Y−1,D +( τC − τA)∆Y0,A +( τD − τB)∆Y0,B.
The volume Y0,C of the penultimate tender C in period 0 is also exogenous.
Underbidding in tender C is formally deﬁned as
Λ0,B +(τD − τC)∆Y0,C < 0.
Under this condition, the banking system has on aggregate build up a red
position at the time of tender D, i.e., in order to satisfy reserve requirements
as an average over the maintenance period, the outstanding central bank credit
after tender D must exceed L∗.
In contrast to the previously studied setting, choice variables for the central
bank are now the volume Y0,D of the last tender in period 0, and the allotment
vector yt for all subsequent periods t ∈ {1,2,...}. The resulting liquidity and
interest rate conditions are determined as before. The central bank’s objective
function is




(rτ − r∗)2 + µ(Lτ − L∗)2¢
dτ],
with choice parameters Y0,D and (yt)t=1,2,....
There are two focal allotment sizes. The ﬁrst is the benchmark amount Y I
that guarantees that the overall liquidity position at the end of the maintenance
period is “neutral,” so that the market rate reaches both the marginal lending
and the deposit rate with equal probability. After an operation C that suﬀered
from insuﬃcient demand, the benchmark amount is typically large, so that
the allotment causes a sizable deviation from the aggregate liquidity target.
The beneﬁt, however, is that the interest rate target is reached without any
deviation. The second focal allotment Y L is the one that generates, from the
settlement day of tender D onwards, an outstanding central bank credit of L∗.
We will refer to Y L as the liquidity-reﬁll allotment. Here the cost is that the
interest rate will rise and potentially reach the marginal lending rate. It is not
diﬃcult to check that only allotments that lie within the interval deﬁned by
these two extreme positions can be optimal for a central bank that maximizes
a weighted sum of the two errors.
Simulations have been performed by ﬁrst choosing Y0,D and using subsequently
the optimal policy derived in the previous section (for t0 =1 ) .S o m e w h a ts u r -
prisingly at ﬁrst sight, we found that the feasibility set in the two-dimensional
ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 17error space, deﬁned by allotment sizes between Y I and Y L, is essentially con-
cave rather than convex (cf. Figure 6). As a consequence, when the central
bank minimizes a weighted sum of quadratic deviations from both liquidity and
interest rate targets, then the optimal choices are the liquidity-reﬁll allotment
Y L and an amount that is slightly smaller than the benchmark allotment Y I.
The simulations suggest the following two comparative statics exercises. Firstly,
the more severe the underbidding, the more costly will it be for the central bank
to make the benchmark allotment. However, the cost in terms of an interest
rate deviation is typically not further increased due to the marginal lending fa-
cility. Thus, ceteris paribus, the more pronounced the underbidding, the more
appropriate appears the liquidity-reﬁll amount (cf. Figure 7). As this predic-
tion essentially corresponds to a non-accomodating central bank strategy that is
conditional on underbidding, this argument shows that the behavior observable
in the data is consistent with an optimal allotment policy.21 A similar compar-
ative statics result is valid concerning the timing of the operations. Speciﬁcally,
the later the tenders in the period, the less costly is the interest rate deviation
for the central bank, and the more appropriate is the tightness at the end of
the period (cf. Figure 8).
It appeared to us that the mechanics of the model do not depend on the inﬁnite
horizon of the planning problem. In fact, the simulations performed on the
basis of the intertemporal model suggest that the impact of the allotment in
tender D on the interest rate is strongest in the current maintenance period,
and that the impact on the outstanding liquidity is strongest before tender A
in the subsequent period. To discuss the optimal allotment in tender D, it may
therefore be suﬃcient, for most practical purposes, to ignore any deviations from
the interest rate target after the end of the current period, and any deviation
from the liquidity target after the time of tender A in the subsequent period. In
the next section, we will therefore consider a boiled-down version of the model
with the intention to reveal the ﬁrst-order mechanics underlying the simulation
results.
21The reason for this somewhat surprising result may be the fact that the assumed objective
function ignores volumes. Even if the shadow cost of further tightening supply may be zero, the
banking sector would “feel” the additional tightness in the form of higher and not remunerated
funding costs.
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We consider the same situation as in the previous section (see Figure 6). The
following parameters are exogenous. Let ΛB denote the interim excess liquidity
accumulated immediately after tender B, let YC b et h ev o l u m eo ft e n d e rC ,
and let ρ denote the end-of-period elasticity (i.e., the liquidity eﬀect). Again
we would like to answer the following question: How to choose the volume of
tender D so as to minimize the weighted quadratic deviations for both interest
rate and liquidity targets?
In order to reach an explicit solution to the problem, we will make the following
approximations. Firstly, as discussed above, ignore any deviation from the in-
terest rate target after the end of the current period, and any deviation from the
liquidity target after the time of tender A in the subsequent period. According
to the simulations performed, these deviations add little to the total deviation.
Next, ignore the discounting. This is no major loss given the reduced horizon.
Finally, as before, assume that the liquidity shock occurs very close to the end




(r − r∗)2 + b µ(L − L∗)2 (7)
s.t.
r − r∗ = −ρ(ΛB +( 1− τC)(YC −
L∗
2











The trade-oﬀ is that a lower YD leads to an increased market rate, while the
outstanding liquidity is lowered. We wish to draw the feasibility set, i.e., the set
of combinations of quadratic interest rate and liquidity deviations that result
from allotments that lie below the sum of total bids in the ultimate tender.
As in the previous section, there are two allotments that jump into the eyes of
the observer. The ﬁrst is the benchmark amount, i.e., the allotment that ends
the maintenance period with an average liquidity position that allows banks to
satisfy reserve requirements in a regular way: the characteristic of this amount
22The relative weight of the liquidity criterion is now
b µ = µ
1 − τD
1+τA − τD
because the central bank cares for the deviation from the liquidity target between tender D
and next period’s tender A.
ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 19is that it implies that the market rate is equal to the target, i.e., r = r∗.U s i n g
(8), this is equivalent to
ΛB +( 1− τC)(YC −
L∗
2















This formula is a theoretical counterpart to the formula for the benchmark
allotment published in ECB [8]. With this allotment, the interest rate target is
met, but the liquidity target is missed by











The second focal allotment size is the liquidity reﬁll that matches the target
L = L∗ for the outstanding central bank credit. Clearly, (9) implies
YD = L∗ − YC,
and the corresponding deviation from the interest rate target is given by




What is the shape of the feasibility set between these two points? To answer
this question, we express (r − r∗) as a function of (L − L∗). From (8) and (9)
we obtain
r − r∗ = −ρ(ΛB +( τD − τC)(YC −
L∗
2
)+( 1− τD)(L − L∗)).
Rearranging gives the feasibility constraint for the monetary authority:23




After an occurrence of underbidding, the right-hand side of this budget equality
is strictly positive (by deﬁnition). The monetary authority therefore faces a
linear trade-oﬀ between interest rate and liquidity smoothing. Figure 9 shows
how this trade-oﬀ translates into a convex feasibility set in the plane of quadratic
deviations by a change of parameters. In particular, in the neighborhood of the
benchmark allotment, the feasibility set has locally the shape of a parabola.
23This constraint is binding when the central bank has chosen not to have recourse to
additional operations.
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the feasibility set. More precisely, the standing facilities restrict the deviation
of the market rate from the target rate in both directions: We have
(r − r∗)2 ≤ (rL − r∗)2 if r>r ∗
(r − r∗)2 ≥ (rD − r∗)2 if r<r ∗.
Figure 10 shows schematically the shape of the feasibility set in the case where
the target rate lies in the center of the corridor, i.e., r∗ =( rL +rD)/2, and the
underbidding has been suﬃciently pronounced.24
Critical role of the liquidity situation at the last tender. Optimal is
either the liquidity-reﬁll amount or an interior solution that is typically close
to, and somewhat smaller than, the benchmark amount. If an interior solution
is optimal, it must solve problem (7), which ignores the standing facilities.
Plugging the constraints (8) and (9) into the central bank’s objective function
and diﬀerentiating with respect to YD yields the optimal allotment in the case
of an interior solution
∆YD = −
(1 − τD)ρ2
(1 − τD)ρ2 + b µ
ΛB −
(1 − τC)(1 − τD)ρ2 + b µ
(1 − τD)2ρ2 + b µ
∆YC.
The resulting interest rate is




(1 − τD)2ρ2 + b µ
.
Thus, the central bank’s problem possesses an interior solution if and only if
the aggregated liquidity position at the time of tender D is moderate in the
s e n s et h a ti ts a t i s ﬁes
β−1(rD − r∗) < ΛB +( τD − τC)∆YC < β−1(rL − r∗).
These inequalities characterize the areas of interest. To start with, if the ag-
gregate liquidity position at the time of tender D is below the lower threshold,
i.e., if
ΛB +(τD − τC)∆YC < −β−1|rD − r∗|,( 1 1 )
then we had a signiﬁcant demand reduction in tender C that did not allow the
central bank to inject the benchmark amount.
24Obviously, if the underbidding is mild, so that even the liquidity-neutral allotment would
not cause the market rate to reach the marginal lending rate, then the trade-oﬀ between
liquidity and interest-rate smoothing is convex, and an interior solution is optimal.
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liquidity target cannot be met. The result is that the central bank optimally
relieves only part of the tightness in the money market.25 The comparative
statics results are now easy to obtain. As β does not depend on ∆YC,t h e
boundary solution is more likely to be optimal when ∆YC is small (cf. again
Figure 7). Similarly, when the timing parameters τC and τD are increased
marginally by the same amount then b µ increases, and the right-hand-side of
the inequality (11) increases, so that a boundary solution becomes more likely
(cf. again Figure 8). Thus, the simpliﬁed model conﬁr m st h er e s u l t so ft h e
simulation study.26
In the other polar case, the aggregate liquidity position is above the upper
threshold, i.e.,
ΛB +( τD − τC)∆YC > β−1(rL − r∗), (12)
which would mean that the monetary authority has decided to allot in tender C
signiﬁcantly more than the benchmark amount. In reality, the probably more
likely case is that a liquidity-providing shock occurs between tenders C and D.
The reader will note that this scenario can be captured by the current model
by adding the shock to the left-hand-side of equation (12). There are again two
focal allotment sizes. The ﬁrst is obviously the benchmark amount Y I,t h a t
guarantees that the overall liquidity position at the end of the maintenance
period is such that the market rate reaches both the marginal lending and the
deposit rate with equal probability. The benchmark would typically be small
in this scenario.
The second focal allotment Y L, typically larger in this scenario, is the one
that generates, from the settlement day of tender D onwards, an outstanding
central bank credit that corresponds to the target L∗. Allotting Y L means
here to ﬂood the market with liquidity, so that the market rate would drop to
the deposit rate. However, in contrast to the scenario of an undersized tender
C, the theoretically optimal allotment may not be feasible due to insuﬃcient
demand. One can show that the shape of the feasibility set is very similar to the
underbidding case. In particular, the monetary authority faces a non-convex
25Apparently, the non-accomodating behavior has been anticipated by the majority of
banks, inducing them to bid more aggressively in the respective last tenders, documented
by a signiﬁcant deviation of the marginal rate from the minimum bid rate.
26The discussion reveals a potential rationale for the neutral allotment policy, that is chosen
by the ECB also for tenders before the last tender: e.g., in the penultimate tender, when the
corridor is symmetric, and there is an additional liquidity shock between tender C and D,
then making the neutral allotment implies that the probability of an interior solution, i.e., of
not reaching the boundary of the corridor, is maximized.
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at the time of tender D increases, then the trade-oﬀ more often will favor the
boundary solution, i.e., the (small) liquidity-reﬁll allotment. Likewise, if the
tenders C and D are closer to the end of the maintenance period, then the
benchmark will ceteris paribus be smaller, and the boundary solution will be
optimal more often.
6 The changes to the operational framework
The formal analysis in this paper has focused on the operational framework, as it
has been in place from January 1999. As already mentioned in the introduction,
the operational framework for montary policy implementation in the euro area
will be slightly changed from March 2004 onwards. The new framework will rely
on non-overlapping transactions with a maturity of one week only. Transactions
will also not hang over into the subsequent period, and the Governing Councel
conﬁnes himself to making policy decisions only at the beginning of maintenance
periods (see [9]).
Clearly, there is no fundamental diﬃculty in modifying the model so that it can
be used to analyze the optimal allotment policy in the new framework. To see
this, assume that we have still four tenders per period, and that transactions
allotted in a tender mature at the time of the next tender. Moreover, assume
that τA = 0, meaning that the ﬁrst tender is at the beginning of the maintenance
period and that the transactions allocated in the last tender mature at the
end of the maintenance period. It is clear that under the new framework,
the intertemporal nature of the problem disappears, so that we can restrict
ourselves to a discussion of one period. We may therefore drop the index t for
the maintenance period in the sequel.
Proposition 1 is valid independent of the timing and maturities of the opera-
tions, when we take account of the fact that the formula for Zt = Z changes.
Speciﬁcally, we would get that
Z = τBYA +(τC − τB)YB +( τD − τC)YC +( 1− τD)YD.
The changes to the other formulas are similarly straightforward, so they are
omitted. Instead, we will conﬁne ourselves to a brief discussion as to whether the
27The feasibility constraint of the central bank remains the same, only that the right-hand-
side of equation (10) is negative. As the deviations from interest-rate and liquidity target are
squared, this leads to the same shape for the feasibility set as in the case of underbidding.
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that the less proactive nature of the optimal allotment policy, when compared
to the ECB’s benchmark allotment rule depends on the speciﬁc timing of the
operations. Even with one-week maturities, and without overlap, we would
expect that a liquidity imbalance would be compensated only gradually under
the optimal policy, so that the benchmark allotment rule would continue to
appear more “proactive” than the optimal policy.
Second, concerning the optimal allotment in the last tender after a liquidity
imbalance, it is of course less likely under the new regime that underbidding
occurs. However, in principle, a liquidity shock during the maintenance period
has the same eﬀect. Then again, we would get a trade-oﬀ between liquidity and
interest-rate smoothing, in fact not very diﬀerent from the one that we discussed
in Section 5. As a consequence, the discontinuity in the reaction function will
arise. Thus, the conclusions of this paper apparently do not depend on the
timing and maturity of the operations in the maintenance period.
7 Conclusion
We have derived the optimal intertemporal allotment policy in a model that cap-
tures some of the institutional features of the Eurosystem’s operational frame-
work for monetary policy implementation. It was shown that the theoretically
optimal allotment policy is not equivalent to the ECB’s benchmark allotment
rule. Speciﬁcally, it was found that the benchmark allotment rule rebalances
the liquidity situation, intuitively speaking, at the ﬁrst opportunity, while the
theoretically optimal policy would typically compensate the same imbalance
more gradually.
The formal analysis suggests also that, somewhat surprisingly, creating a sub-
stantial monetary tightness at the end of the maintenance period after an oc-
currence of underbidding may be consistent with pursuing an optimal allotment
policy. The rationale for this conclusion is that when the volume of the penulti-
mate tender in a maintenance period has been insuﬃcient, and the last tender
is close to the end of the period, then the benchmark allotment would be very
large. Injecting the benchmark allotment would therefore imply that the out-
standing central bank credit is temporarily much larger than usual. On the
other hand, once the allotment is chosen to be tight, there will be no further
deviation from the interest rate target by a somewhat tighter allotment. As
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gregate outstanding credit with the target level. In fact, it follows from these
arguments that the optimal reaction of the monetary authority will be a discon-
tinuous function of the prevailing liquidity conditions, which would provide a
possible explanation for the Eurosystem’s recent deviations from the benchmark
allotment rule.
8 Appendix A. Calibration and simulation
In this appendix, we will brieﬂy describe the performed calibration and the
simulation methods.
Calibration. Most parameters can be set to realistic values without diﬃculty.
This applies to the key policy rates r∗,rL,rD, to the reserve requirements R,t o
the timing parameters τA,τB,τC,τD, and to the initial conditions Y−1,C,Y −1,D.
The discount rate was set very low, reﬂecting our hypothesis that the central
bank cares about interest-rate and liquidity conditions prevailing in the current
period much more than about the corresponding conditions in the subsequent
period.
The only parameter that requires some care is the liquidity eﬀect.28 In order to
measure ρ, we have collected daily liquidity data as well as the liquidity fore-
casts that are published by the ECB prior to the main reﬁnancing operations,
covering the period January 1, 1999 to October 9, 2002. We have generated
from the data set the historical distribution of the autonomous factor shock
accumulated between the last tender and the ﬁnal day of the maintenance pe-
riod. By autonomous factor shock, we mean here the actual shock minus the
ﬁgure that has been predicted in the ECB’s liquidity forecast. The historical
distribution has then been transformed into the curve depicted in Figure 11 in
the following way.
Start with a deﬁnite value for the liquidity surplus or shortage created by the
allotment in the last tender, say, ∆Lt = 5 bn euro days in excess. We wish
t od e t e r m i n et h ee x p e c t e dv a l u ef o rt h em a r k e tr a t ea tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d .
Presupposing equation (3), we have
E[rs
t]=rD +p r o b {∆L − At < 0}(rL − rD).
28See Hamilton (1997) for a quantiﬁcation of the liquidity eﬀect in the market for U.S.
Federal Funds.
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tight. This will be the case if and only if the autonomous factor shock absorbes
a liquidity of 5 bn euro days or more. So we derived from the data the relative
likelihood that a shock after the last operation will have this property. It turns
out that in about 25% of the historical cases, we had a shock absorbing 5 bn
euro days or more after the last operation. Taking expectations, and assuming
a ±1 percent width of the interest rate corridor, yields a market rate that lies
0.5 percentage points below the mid of the corridor. The other diamonds in
Figure 11 are calculated analogously.
The curve is obviously non-linear, but when a rough linear approximation is
chosen, then we have a slope of approximately 8 basis points per bn euro days.
That is, if a liquidity-absorbing shock of, say 3 bn euro days occurs after the
last operation in the period, then the expected rate at the end of the main-
tence period would (in the linear approximation) be 24 basis points above the
midpoint between the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility. The
interpretation of this ﬁgure is that if banks use their information about the
autonomous factor shock, then a tightness of 3 bn euro days, created by a
smaller-than-neutral allotment in the last tender, would drive up market rates
by the beforementioned 24 basis points.29
Simulation. Having calibrated the parameters, we calculated the optimal
policy numerically for a number of inititial conditions. It turned out to be
useful that the policy matrix P can be numerically approximated as the limit
of the sequence P(k),d e ﬁned by
P(0) =0
P(k) = K − H0(Q + δB0P(k−1)B)−1H,
which allows a numerical computation of the optimal allotment policy. The
iterative solution to the Riccati equation has been found by explicitly calcu-
lating 20 rounds of the approximation. Convergence was very fast, so that the
c h o s e nn u m b e ro fi t e r a t i o ns t e p sw a sm u c hh i g h e rt h a nn e e d e di na l lc a l c u l a t e d
examples. Further details on calibration and simulation are available from the
ﬁrst-named author.
29Our estimate lies in the range of other quantiﬁcations. See Ejerskov et al. [10], as well as
references given therein.
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This appendix contains the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .We rewrite the central bank’s objective function as an














(rτ − r∗)2 + µ(Lτ − L∗)2¢
dτ]
In the limit τs → 1, the market rate is constant in each maintenance period,
















δt−t0{(1 − δ)(rt − r∗)2
+µ{(1 − δτA)(∆Yt−1,C + ∆Yt−1,D)2
+(δτA − δτB)(∆Yt−1,D + ∆Yt,A)2 +( δτB − δτC)(∆Yt,A + ∆Yt,B)2
+(δτC − δτD)(∆Yt,B + ∆Yt,C)2 +( δτD − δ)(∆Yt,C + ∆Yt,D)2}.
Since
rt − r∗ = −ρ{τA∆Yt−1,C + τB∆Yt−1,D
+(τC − τA)∆Yt,A +( τD − τB)∆Yt,B













=( 1 − δ)ρ2{τA∆Yt−1,C + τB∆Yt−1,D
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+(1 − τC)∆Yt,C +( 1− τD)∆Yt,D}2
+µ{(1 − δτA)(∆Yt−1,C + ∆Yt−1,D)2 +( δτA − δτB)(∆Yt−1,D + ∆Yt,A)2
+(δτB − δτC)(∆Yt,A + ∆Yt,B)2 +( δτC − δτD)(∆Yt,B + ∆Yt,C)2
+(δτD − δ)(∆Yt,C + ∆Yt,D)2}.






where the matrices are given by
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δτB − δτC δτB − δτD δτC − δτD 0
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This proves Lemma 1. ¤
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .Consider the optimal linear regulator problem where







subject to the law of motion
xt+1 = Byt,







The maximization is with respect to sequences {yt,x t}∞
t=0. Then, the theory
of quadratic linear dynamic programming (see problem 4.1 in Ljungqvist and
Sargent, [16]) predicts that the optimal policy has the form
yt = −(Q + δB0PB)−1Hxt,
where P solves the algebraic matrix Riccati equation
P = K + H0(Q + δB0PB)−1H.
This proves the assertion. ¤
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ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 32Figure 2. Time structure of the model: four tenders per maintenance period, overlapping










































































































































































































































Figure 3. Smoothing response of the central bank to an initial liquidity deficit





































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Choosing the allotment in tender D.

























































































































































































































































Figure 6. Tightness in response to demand reduction is consistent with an optimal allotment
policy; the figure shows an calibrated example, assuming 20% underbidding in tender C.





























































































































































Figure 7. Strong underbidding suggests tight liquidity provision. Comparative statics with respect
to the volume of tender C.

















































































































































Figure 8. Later operations also suggest tightness. Comparative statics with respect to the
timing parameters.












































































































Figure 9.  The shape of the feasibility set.







































































































































Figure 10.  The arrows indicate a more restrictive allotment decision.
ECB • Working Paper No 295 • December 2003 41Figure 11. The figure shows the expected spread, caused by a liquidity imbalance of a given
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